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ABSTRACT 
This paper  begins by identifying  nominal price stickiness  as the logical 
basis for the Keynesian or  activist point of view  concerning demand management 
policy.  It then characterizes  two alternative  approaches  to policy  analysis 
that  have  been  adopted  by  adherents  of  the  Keynesian  position,  the 
"disequilibrium"  and  "Phillips curve"  approaches  The  former  is  inherently 
defective,  It  is  argued,  while  the  latter  has  yet  to  be  satisfactorily 
implemented.  Indeed,  implementation  that  is  not  open  to  Lucas—critique 
weaknesses  is not in sight,  In response  to the  implied dilemma  for policy 
makers,  the paper  describes  a rule  for the  conduct of monetary  policy  that 
relies  upon  minimal  understanding  of  price-adjustment  dynamics  and  which 
should  be  robust  to  regulatory  and  technological  change  in  the  economys 
financial  and  payments  institutions.  A  bit  of  evidence  is  presented  to 
suggest that the rule would,  if adopted, lead to approximately zero inflation 
(on  average)  and  to  output/employment  fluctuations  that  are  small  by 
historical  standards:  Possible  criticisms  relating  to  recent  European 
experience and to  recent theoretical developments are considered. 
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(412)268—2347 I.  Introduction 
In his General Theory, Keynes  (1936) put forth  the radical proposition 
that competitive market  economies  have no automatic  mechanism that  tends, in 
the  absence  of  governmental  policy  guidance,  to  eliminate  or  prevent 
unemployment.  After  a lengthy period of debate  that was  often confused,  in 
part because of Keynes's reliance on  non—traditional  concepts and terminology, 
it came  to be widely  agreed  that this  proposition  was false  as a matter of 
pure  economic  theory.'  But  it  also  came  to  be  widely  agreed  that  the 
economy's  self—correcting  forces work slowly,  so that  well—designed  demand 
management  policy  actions  can  be  helpful  in  reducing  the  magnitude  and 
duration  of departures  of employment  and output  from their  full equilibrium 
levels.  An  influential expression of  this point of  view——the activist demand— 
management  position—-was provided by Patinkin  (1951). 
But,  as all  readers  are well  aware, a number  of  challenges  to this 
position have arisen in the past 20  years.  Arguments  by influential analysts 
including Friedman  (1968),  Lucas (1972), Sargent and Wallace (1975). and Barro 
(1979) have claimed that the intellectual foundations of the activist position 
are seriously  flawed, and have suggested that activist policies are apt to be 
counterproductive.  Several weaknesses  in these arguments have  been detected,2 
however, and there has  recently been  something of a resurgence  of Keynesian 
sentiment  among macroeconomic  researchers.3  At present, consequently,  there 
exists  substantial  disagreement among  leading scholars  concerning  the nature 
of macroeconomic phenomena and the kind of policy that should be  pursued. 
The present paper begins by identifying nominal price stickiness as the 
logical basis  for the Keynesian  or activist  point  of view concerning  demand 
policy.  It then characterizes two alternative  approaches  to policy  analysis 
that  have  been  adopted  by  adherents  of  the  Keynesian  position,  the 
—1— disequilibrium  and  Phillips  curve"  approaches.  The  former  is  inherently 
defective,  it  is  argued,  while  the  latter  has  yet  to  be  satisfactorily 
implemented.  Indeed,  implementation  that  is  not  open to  Lucas—critique 
weaknesses  Is not  In sight.  In response to the Implied dilemma  for policy 
makers,  the  paper  proposes  a rule for the  conduct of monetary  policy  that 
relies  upon  minimal  understanding  of  price—adjustment  dynamics  and  which 
should  be  robust  to  regulatory  and  technological  change  in  the  economys 
financial  and payments  Institutions.  A bit  of  evidence  is  presented  to 
suggest that the rule would,  If adopted, lead •to approximately zero inflation 
(on  average)  and  to  output/employment  fluctuations  that  are  small  by 
historical  standards.  Possible  criticisms  relating  to  recent  European 
experience and to  recent theoretical developments are considered. 
—2— II.  Disequilibrium Analysis 
It is widely  agreed  that  the Keynesian  rationale  for activist  demand- 
management  policy  is based  on a  presumption  that  there exists  a significant 
extent of  nominal  price  tickiness somewhere  in the  macroeconomic  system. 
This stickiness may pertain to  product prices or  wages or  both, but some type 
is necessary  for the  Keynesian  diagnosis  and remedy  to be applicable.  For 
without  any  price  stickiness,  real  demands  and  supplies  for  commodities 
including labor will be  equated in  a fashion that leaves no  clear—cut role for 
demand management.  And since demand—management actions are effected by  way of 
nominal  instrument variables,  policy manipulation of  real aggregate demand  is 
itself  dependent  upon  a significant  degree of nominal  stickiness.4  It is 
nominal aggregate demand that is generally open to  manipulation and with  which 
demand-management policy  is properly concerned. 
The  crucial  status  of  price  stickiness  in  the  context  of demand- 
management analysis leads directly to a significant  issue:  how is the concept 
of  "price  stickiness"  to  be  represented  analytically?  The  concept  is 
evidently  one that  is inherently  dynamic in  nature  but, as we all know,  the 
formal  analysis  of Keynes  (1938)  and  of  those  writers5  who  clarified  the 
message of the General Theory was conducted In  a comparative-static framework. 
Accordingly, some means  had to  be found for representing a dynamic concept in 
a  static  setting.  The  device  adopted  by  Keynes  and  the  other  early 
contributors was that of  conditional equilibrium analysis——comparative  statics 
in which  the economy a  slowly—adjusting  prices  are  treated as if they were 
fixed  quantitIes.  Policy  experiments  conducted  under  this  approach  are 
comparative—static  exercises  carried  out  conditional  upon  "given" values of 
the prices  that are  hypothesized to adjust  slowly.  For some given value  of 
the  nominal  wage  rate,  for  example,  the  analyst  could  compare  values  of 
—3— endogenous  variables  that  would  obtain  under  alternative  hypothetical 
magnitudes  of the money  stock or government purchases and use this comparison 
as the  basis  for  analysis  of an economy  in which  the nominal  wage  adjusts 
slowly. 
But  of course  actual  economics  are not  static  entities,  but  ongoing 
dynamic systems.  So the question  remains of how to relate these  conditional 
comparative—static  exercises  to actual  problems  of demand  management.  One 
conceivable approach would  be simply to  pretend that static analysis provides 
a satisfactory approximation.  According  to that approach,  the analyst would 
use the model  in choosing  policy  actions at time  t by treating  the current 
value of the sticky  price  (e.g.  Wt) as historically given  and ignoring  the 
future  (which can perhaps be attended to when it becomes the present).  Then 
later in period  t+l the  new value  could be  treated as historically given 
and new policy  actions selected  conditional  upon that  value.  By proceeding 
period after  period In this fashion, it would  be possible  for the analyst to 
use the static model  in  practice without ever developing any explanation  for 
the Wt+j values that are "given" in the successive periods. 
It  would seem  to be Indisputable, however, that such a way of proceeding 
is highly  suboptimal.  For  even  if W  were  actually a given magnitude in  t,  in 
the sense  of being unresponsive  to current policy actions,  its current value 
would  certainly have been  influenced by  economic conditions and policy  actions 
of  the  past.  Any  (temporarily)  fixed  price  should  be  classified  as  a 
predetermined  variable,  not  as  one  that  is  literally  exogenous.  Policy 
actions taken  in t will  accordingly  have effects on future  prices-—on W,1, 
etc.—-and these effects  are Ignored In the procedure  under  discussion. 
That procedure is consequently bound to be suboptimal. 
As well  as I can determine,  this suboptimal approach to policy  analysis 
—4— is Implicity recommended In  most  of the literature  that has passed  under  the 
title of 'disequilibrium  or "fixed—price' macroeconomics.'  The  technically 
sophisticated  contributors  to that  literature might  deny any  intention  that 
their work  be  used in such a manner, but it is unclear that there is any other 
way  to proceed with  a model  that  provides  no explanation  for  the evolution 
over  time  of the  system's  sticky  prices.  The primary  objection  to these 
models, according to my  argument, is  not that they treat prices as  temporarily 
rigid,  but  that  they  Include  no  explanation  of  price  adjustment  between 
periods.  From  a  practical  policy  perspective,  these  models  are  crucially 
incomplete. 
1 
A  rather  vivid  illustration  of the  potentially  misleading  nature  of 
policy  analysis conducted with  an incomplete,  fixed—price  model  was provided 
by  an  example  developed  in McCallum  (1980),  In the  model  used  for  this 
example, real aggregate  demand y  is assumed to be dependent upon real money 
balances, real government  purchases,  and a  stochastic  shock  term while  (for 
simplicity)  aggregate supply  is taken  to be a  constant, y  = ,  Prices  are 
set at  the first of each period and are unresponsive to  developments occurring 
within the period, i.e., to  shock realizations.  Consequently, y  and y  will 
typically fail to coincide in which case the quantity actually transacted——the 
output  forthcoming——is  determined  as in the disequilibrium  literature  as the 
smaller  of the  two:  t  mm  (y, y).  When  there is a  negative shock to 
to  demand, there will be  a tendency  for  y  y  to  exceed y  implying 
Keynesian unemployment proportional to y — y. 
Clearly this model  is such that within  any period  in which Yt < . it is 
the  case  that  if  the  money  stock  or  government  purchases  were  larger  in 
magnitude, then y  would be greater and y — t  would be smaller--perhaps zero. 
So  from the perspective  of conditional comparative  statics the model seems to 
-5— be supportive of the idea that activist demand management can be  effective in 
terms of preventing unemployment. 
But  in order  to discuss  the average effects over  time  of a sustained 
policy  strategy,  one  needs  to complete  the  model  by specifying  how  prices 
adjust  between  periods  and  adding  policy  rules  that  determine  policy 
instrument settings.  In the example under  discussion,  the price  adjustment 
specification  Is an augmented  Phillips  relation  in which  the  proportionate 
price change is determined by  the previous periods excess supply  -  and 
the expected proportionate  change of the market—clearing  price  level.8  The 
policy  instruments, finally, are set  by  feedback rules  that take  account of 
all relevant variables  realized in the past.  Current magnitudes  are assumed 
unknown, however, to  the policy authorities. 
In this  setting,  to come  to the  point,  it is  demonstrated  that  if 
expectations  are  rational  the  famous  (or  infamous)  policy—ineffectiveness 
proposition  obtains.  That  is,  the  evolution  of Yt  (and  thus  y—) is 
independent of the coefficients  of the policy  feedback  rules:  whether  the 
instrument  settings  feature strong  responses or none at all  to (e.g.) past 
excess  supply  values  makes  no  difference  whatsoever  in  the  time  series 
behavior of Yt  or 
The purpose of citing  this example is not, it should be emphasized, to 
suggest that the policy  ineffectiveness  proposition  Is applicable  to actual 
economies.  It is, rather, to  Illustrate the potentially misleading  nature of 
conditional  comparative—static  policy  analysis  with  incomplete  fixed—price 
models.  Such analysis  is prone to overstate  the potential  effectiveness  of 
demand management policy by failing to take account of dynamic considerations 
concerning  the  manner in  which  currently  "given"  prices  reflect  previous 
responses.to past economic conditions. 
-8- III.  Price Adjustment Models 
Many  practical  Keynesian  analysts--especially  those  working  with 
quantitative models——have  recognized  the  point  of the  previous  section,  of 
course, and have adopted instead a second approach.  Instead of treating the 
model's  sticky price  or prices as If they came out of the blue, this second 
approach  adds'  to  the  static  Keynesian  model  another  equation  or  set  of 
equations—-a  "Phillips  curve" or a  "wage-price sector——designed  to explain 
movements  over  time  in  the  slowly—adjusting  price  or  prices.  This  step 
converts  the  model  into  one  that  is dynamic  and  complete,  and renders  it 
usable for policy  analysis that avoids  the particular source of suboptimality 
described above, 
But while  the Inclusion of price-adjustment  equations  makes the second 
approach  more  suitable  than  the  first, as a method  of adapting  Keynesian 
models to  demand management purposes, the price adjustment equations that have 
been  used  in practice  are  open to  a number  of  objections.  At  the  most 
sympathetic  level, one objection  is that most of the utilized specifications 
fail to satisfy the natural rate hypothesis.  i.e.,  the hypothesis  that there 
is no  path of price level or  nominal demand values that will keep unemployment 
permanently  below its natural-rate value.'0  This hypothesis,  which expresses 
the notion  that it is not possible for a society to  permanently  enrich Itself 
in  real  terms  by  monetary  means,  is  generally  accepted  by  neoclassical 
theorists and  Is paid lip service by most Keynesian writers,  but is violated 
by most econometric  specifications.  Models  incorporating  the concept  of a 
non—accelerating—inflation-rate-of—unemployment  (NAIRU), for example,  do not 
satisfy  the natural rate hypothesis.  For if there is a stable  relationship 
between  the unemployment  rate  and the  inflation acceleration  variable,  then 
there  are  evidently  price  level  time  paths  that  represent  an acceleration 
—7— magnitude  that  would  yield  a  permanently  lowered  unemployment  rate.''  Of 
course  the builders  of such models  do not  intend that  they be applicable to 
impractical' conditions such  as a maintained acceleration of inflation.  But 
this type of disclaimer  amounts to an  admission  that the relation in question 
is not structural——i.e., is not invariant to policy regimes. 
A more fundamental  criticism of existing price adjustment specifications 
is expressed  by  proponents  of the jibrium  approach  to business  cycle 
analysis.  All readers will be  aware that this line of work  began with  Lucas's 
(1972) celebrated  theory of a Phillips—type relationship  between nominal and 
real variables that  results from confusion due to information gaps,  not from 
price stickiness per se.  Most readers will also know that Lucas's theory has 
recently suffered  a decline  in popularity as a consequence of its reliance, 
for real effects  of monetary  shocks, on an implausible  degree  of ignorance 
concerning current Monetary conditions on  the pmrt of  rational private agents. 
Since  information  regarding  various  aggregate  nominal  magnitudes--price 
indices  as  well  as  money  supply  figures——is  available  both  promptly  and 
cheaply, the Lucas  "Monetary misperceptions"  model  has come  to be viewed  as 
inapplicable to today's developed economies.'2 
Disenchantment with  the misperceptions model has not, however, led to the 
demise  of the  equilibrium  school  of business  cycle  analysis.  Indeed, an 
important  group  of  researchers  has  in a sense  retained  the  Lucas  model'3 
despite its failure to rationalize output  and employment  effects of  monetary 
shocks.  Specifically, this  group  has developed  a real business  cycle  (RBC) 
approach which  denies that there is  in fact any significant effect of monetary 
policy  actions  (even  if  unanticipated)  on  output.  The  money-output 
correlations that  appear  in the data are attributed,  by RBC  proponents,  to 
"reverse causation,"  i.e., policy  and/or  banking sector  responses  to output 
—8— fluctuations.  These fluctuations, to  complete the story, are brought about by 
real shocks, primarily exogenous shocks to  technology. 
The  RBC  approach—-which  stems  from the  work  of Kydland  and Prescott 
(1982),  Long  and Plosser  (1983), end King and  Plosser  (1984)--has  gained  a 
considerable  a2ount  of  support  in  part  because  of  the  elusiveness  of  a 
rigorous theoretical  account of money—to-output  influences,  but also  because 
of quantitative work supportive  of  the RBC hypothesis.  The pioneering  study 
in this regard is  that of Kydland and Prescott (1982), which demonstrates that 
a surprisingly good quantitative match to actual business cycle facts'' can be 
obtained  (via simulations) with  a quantitative equilibrium  model  in which  a 
stochastic  technology  shock  provides  the  source  of fluctuations.  In 
particular,  the  RBC  models  imply  procyclical  fluctuations  in  labor 
productivity  and  real  wages,  an  implication  that  is  more  consistent  with 
actual  data  than  those  of many traditional  models  that  attribute  cycles  to 
demand  fluctuations.  Also,  the  relative  variability  of  consumption  and 
investment expenditures  is well  explained, as well as the serial  correlation 
in  output  and  employment  magnitudes.  These  implications  require  the 
assumption that technology shocks  are highly persistent, but that is entirely 
plausible. 
Other types of evidence have also  been put forth as supportive of  the RBC 
hypothesis.  I  have argued  (McCallum, 1986) that much  of  this is inconclusive 
if not irrelevant, but it remains a striking fact that money stock  and other 
demand-related  variables  have  very  little  predictive  content  for  output 
fluctuations, especially in data series that have been first—differenced. 
Probably the most serious weakness of the RBC approach is the lack of a 
convincing description of  the unobserved "technology shocks" that it posits as 
the source of cyclical fluctuations.  If the term Is interpreted  literally as 
-9— referring to shifts  in the state-of--knowledge  physical  frontier relationship 
between  inputs  and outputs,  then it  would  seem implausible  that  there could 
exist  much  variability  at  the  aggregate  level:  specific  technological 
improvements should  impact on the production  functions  for only a  few of the 
economys  many products.  And  independent  shocks  to  different  productive 
sectors would tend to average out, yielding a relatively small variance in the 
aggregate. 
For  this  and  other  reasons,  most  macroeconomists  have  found  the RBC 
hypothesis  unconvincing.  But the vitality of the research being conducted by 
the RBC school  is a testimony  to the attraction  of the equilibrium  approach 
and to the dissatisfaction  of many  economists  with existing models of price 
stickiness,  Let  us  then  return  to our  main theme  by reviewing  the basic 
rationale for the equilibrium approach. 
Existing  equilibrium  models are ones  in which  all prices  are perfectly 
free to  adjust within each period, but that is not the defining characteristic 
of the approach.  The  latters basic requirement,  rather, is that a models 
behavioral  relations  should  all be rationalized  in terms  of  - - 
optimizing agents-—households  and firms——in  response  to their own objectives 
and  the  constraints  they face  (Lucas,  1980).  The  motivation  for  this 
modelling strategy  is the objective of  producing a model that is well-designed 
for the guidance of economic policy.  The presumption  is that by focussing on 
agents  objectives  and constraints, it might  be possible to construct a model 
consisting  entirely  of  relations  that  are  truly  structural.  Relations 
derived  in  this  way  would,  because  of  the  autonomy  of  preferences  and 
technology,  stand a reasonable chance of  being invariant to  policy changes. 
As stated  above,  this  strategy  does not  necessarily  rule  out  price 
stickiness,  One can  conceive of a model,  for example,  in which  multiperiod 
—10- nominal  contracts  are  endogenously  explained  as  the  response  of  rational 
agents to  adjustment,  bargaining, or  marketing  costs--in which case the model 
could  be of the equilibrium  variety.  But the approach  does  not permit  the 
inclusion of relations describing sluggish price adjustments  effected by "the 
market"  or by some  fictitious  "auctioneer"  with ill—defined  or nonexistent 
objectives.  Being  poorly  understood——not  based  on  well—posed  choice 
problems——such relations  would  not be structural.  They would  not,  in other 
words,  provide  the  analyst  with any  basis  for  knowing  whether  they  would 
remain  in  place  or shift  if policy  were  substantially  altered.  But  such 
knowledge  is clearly crucial for designing policy, as a shift would invalidate 
the models predictions about the effects of a contemplated policy  change.  In 
summary, it is necessary, according  to the equilibrium-approach  viewpoint,  to 
understand  the  nature  of  price-adjustment  sluggishness  to  know  if  its 
quantitative  characteristics  will  remain  intact  In  the  face  of  altered 
conditions. 
The forgoing argument Is of course an  application of  the  Lucas critique' 
developed In Lucas (1976).  In  principle, its considerations are applicable to 
most components of a macroeconomic model.  But because of the crucial role of 
expectational considerations in  the price—adjustment  sectors of these models, 
it  is  these  sectors  that  would  seem to be especially  susceptible  to  the 
critique.  Relations among variables all of  one type, either  nominal or real, 
would  seem  to be less likely to  break  down in response  to demand—management 
policy changes." 
The  foregoing  discussion  suggests  that,  in principle,  the  modelling 
strategy of the equilibrium  approach  could  provide a  satisfactory  basis  for 
demand-management policy analysis.  In practice, however,  It has proved to be 
extremely  difficult  to  model  sluggish  price  adjustments  in  the  manner 
—11— required.  Tangible  resource  costs  of  making  price  changes  seem  to  be 
negligibly small, while  bargaining" and "marketing" costs of  price adjustment 
are  poorly  understood.  Consequently,  to  the  present  time  all  equilibrium 
models  have been ones with complete price flexibility and, therefore, no role 
for  demand  management.  No model  of sticky prices  has  been devised  that 
combines empirical  veracity with an adjustment  specification that  is clearly 
based on individuals  objectives and constraints. 
As a result, a sizeable group of researchers  has reacted against Lucas's 
suggestion  that  price  stickiness  needs  to  be  explained  along 
equilibrium—approach  lines.  In reality, these researchers  contend, prices do 
not  adjust  promptly  for  a  variety  of  complicated  strategic  and  seal— 
institutional reasons that are not amenable to  taste-and-technology  analysis. 
Consequently  it is better  (according to their view) to  use a poorly understood 
but  empirically  justifiable  Phillips—type  relation  than  to  pretend—— 
counterfactually——that  all  price  adjustment  take  place  promptly,  as 
equilibrium analysts have assumed in practice.  An  econometric model based  on 
this presumption will  track data better than if it incorporated the hypothesis 
of perfectly  flexible prices.  And policy  predictions  provided by the model 
could  be satisfactory  if the adjustment  relation  did not shift  sharply when 
policy changes were  undertaken. 
It is hard  not to have considerable  sympathy for this last suggestion. 
Yet,  on the other  hand, the logic of the Lucas  critique is Inescapable:  how 
can one know that the adjustment  relation will  not shift sharply If he does 
not  understand  its  nature?  Finding  a way out  of  the  implied  dilemma  is 
perhaps  the  'ost crucial  task  confronting  policy-oriented  macroeconomists 
today. 
-12— IV.  A Strategy for Monetary Policy 
In light of the policy  dilemma just described, the appropriate  response 
would seem to be one that is not excessively ambitious  My  proposed approach 
begins  by  accepting  the  idea  that  the  nature  of  price  adjustment 
relations—-and  thus  the  connection  between  nominal  and  real  variables—-is 
poorly understood.  There  is no compelling basis for selecting any one of the 
numerous competing theories of  this mechanism, and no  good prospect for better 
understanding in the near future.  But the proposed approach reflects optimism 
nevertheless,  for it involves a strategy for monetary policy  behavior'7  that 
gives promise of being effective regardless of the nature of  the mechanism. 
The basic idea is that, In  whatever way it is that monetary  (or  fiscal) 
actions affect output, they do so  through an  intermediate influence on  nominal 
aggregate demand.  Evidence  suggests, furthermore, that cyclical  fluctuations 
in  real output and employment are strongly related to those In  nominal demand. 
Real GNP growth  Is usually strong, that is, when nominal GNP growth  is above 
average.  1a  Consequently,  there  Is  some  basis  for  belief  that  cyclical 
fluctuations  In real  output  would  be significantly  dampened  if nominal  GNP 
were  kept on  a smooth and steady growth path. 
Of course the last statement would be  questioned by proponents of  the RBC 
hypothesis.  But  according  to  their  theory,  the  behavior  of  output  Is 
Independent  of nominal  variables  In any event,  and  the behavior  of nominal 
variables  Is of no concern——except  to the  extent  that  inflation  imposes an 
inefficient  tax on the  holders  of real  money  balances.  Consequently,  RBC 
proponents should have no objection to a policy strategy that yields a steady 
growth rate for nominal ON!'," provided that it is not Inflationary. 
At what  rate should nominal GNP be made to grow?  While a mild deflation 
in accordance with  the "ChIcago Rule of  Friedman (1969) is perhaps preferable 
-13— in  principle,  from a practical point of view there is much to be said for an 
average inflation rate of  zero.2°  Taking  that as a goal, then,  I  suggest that 
nominal GNP should  be made  to grow  at a rate equal  to the long-term  average 
rate of  real output growth for the economy in question——about 3%  per year, for 
example, for the United States, 
My suggested approach does not, however, consist merely of the adoption 
of a  target  path  for nominal  GNP.  Equally essential  is  the mechanism  for 
achieving  that  path.  In  that regard  three  considerations  are  extremely 
important.  First,  the mechanism  should  involve a policy  rule  that dictates 
each period's  setting of the policy  instrument.  It is important  to have  a 
rule, rather  than relying on "discretionary"  period-by-period  choices  of the 
instrument  setting,  in  order  to  avoid  dynamic  inconsistency  of  the  type 
described by  Kydland and Prescott  (1977) and Barro and Gordon  (1983).  Those 
authors  show that period-by—period  attempts  to  optimize,  by  a  monetary 
authority  who  seeks  to avoid  both  inflation  and unemployment,  will  lead  to 
more inflation and no less unemployment (on average) than could be  obtained by 
adherence to a rule.  It is my opinion that this type of inconsistency offers 
the  best available  explanation  for  the  unprecedented  postwar  inflationary 
experience  of  most  developed  countries,  experience  which  has  seen  the  CPI 
climb  to 4.5 times  its  1950  level  in the U.S.  and nearly  11  times  in the 
U.K. 21 
Second,  the rule needs  to pertain to a directly  controllable variable, 
rather  than one  such as  the  Ml  money  stock  (or  any  broader  measure). 
Otherwise,  the  rule will  not  be  operationally  specified.  Third.  the  rule 
should  be  designed  in  a manner  that  does  not  rely  upon  the  absence  of 
regulatory  change  and  technical  innovation  in  the  payments  and  financial 
industries.  While  these  processes  may  not  produce  as much  turmoil  in the 
—14— future  as they have  in the recent past it would  be unreasonable  to presume 
that they will not be present again to a significant extent. 
Following  up on previous  suggestions of mine  (McCallum, 1984).  1  have 
recently developed in  quantitative terms a rule for U.S. monetary policy based 
on  these  considerations.  This  rule  dictates  quarterly  settings  for  the 
monetary  base  that  are  designed  to keep nominal  GNP close  to a  3% growth 
path.22  It does not rely on  any specific model  of the economy or  any details 
regarding  the  financial  system; all it presumes  is that an increase in the 
growth rate of  the monetary base  tends to have a stimulative effect on  nominal 
GNP.  Defining bt 
= log of monetary base (for quarter t), Xt  log of nominal 
GNP, and  xtm  target—path value of x, the rule is as follows: 




+  0.25 (x1 
- x1). 
Here  the  constant  term  is  simply  a  3%  annual  growth  rate  expressed  in 
quarterly  logarithmic  units,  while  the  second  term  subtracts  from  this  the 
average growth rate of base velocity over the previous four years23  Finally. 
the third term adds a gentle  adjustment in response to cyclical departures  of 
GNP from  its target path. 
To  determine whether this rule would  indeed keep  nominal GNP close to  the 
desired  growth  path,  one must  experiment  with the  economy or with a model. 
The  former  possibility  is  too  expensive  and  the  latter  suffers  from  the 
absence of any reliable model.  But it is my  conjecture that the proposed rule 
would  perform  well  with  a  wide  variety  of  ode1s.  Here  I  will  briefly 
summarize  results  for  three  extremely  simple  models.  The  first  is  an 
atheoretic  regression of xt on Abt and axt_l;  for the sample period  1954-85 
the estimates are as  follows; 
= 0.00749  + 0.257  Xt_l 
-  -).487  abt 
i.  et 
(.002)  (.079)  (.121) 
-15— 0.23  = 0.0010  OW =  2.11. 
Generating  bt  and  xt  values  from  the  proposed  rule  and  this  model,  with 
residuals  fed  in  each period  to  represent  shocks,  one  estimates  that  the 
root-mean-square  value of x  — xt4  for 1954-85 would  have been only  2.0% had 
the rule  been  in effect.  Actual  historical  policy, by contrast,  yielded  a 
77.1% root—mean—square  error  (RMSE) relative to the xt4 target path 
24 and  a 
8.5% RMSE relative  to a fitted  linear  trend.  The second  model  differs  from 
the  first  only  in  lagging  abt  one  quarter,  to  reduce  the  possibility  of 
reverse  causation  in the  estimated  effects.  The  resulting  coefficient 
estimates are not much  different  and the simulated  RMSE for 1954-85 is 2.2%. 
The  third  model  explored  to date  is a  four  variable  vector  autoregression 
system  in which the variables are growth  rates of the base, the price  level, 
and real GNP, plus a nominal interest rate.  With  this system, the estimated 
RI4SE value is again 2.2%. 
Of course each  of  these experiments is in  principle subject to the Lucas 
critique.  I  would  argue  that  the  first  two are  less  susceptible——for  the 
reason  sketched  above-—than  if  the  models  included  both real  and nominal 
variables.  But my main line of defense In this regard  is to be  based  on the 
robustness of  the rule to  widely different models.2 
My contention  Is not only that the  suggested  policy  rule  would  keep 
nominal GNP  close  to  its target  path and  thereby eliminate  inflation,  but 
would  also  result  In  smaller  cyclical  fluctuations  In  real  output  and 
employment than the U.S.  economy has experienced  in the postwar era.  But we 
know  that these  fluctuations  have  been small  relative  to those  of previous 
historical eras, and reasonably  small in absolute terms.  Thus the contention 
is  that the proposed rule would, If  utilized in  a developed economy,26  result 
In  macroeconomic performance of a high standard. 
—16— V.  Topical Issues 
Before  concluding,  it will  be useful  briefly to address  a  few topical 
issues  concerning  the  proposed  policy  rule  and,  more generally,  Keynesian 
views on the need  for activist demand management.  The first of these issues 
pertains  to the unusually  high unemployment  rates  experienced  during  recent 
years in  many European nations, including the U.K.  While some  economists have 
attributed  this  unemployment  primarily  to  inadequate  demand,  our  proposed 
policy rule would have dictated substantially less nominal demand growth  than 
was actually experienced  over the last decade or so.  Should  this be  regarded 
as a mark against the rule? 
To  answer that question properly one would have to  identify the source of 
the unusual  unemployment.  Clearly,  such a  task  is beyond  the  scope  of the 
remainder of the present paper.  Nevertheless, as a crude check on the notion 
that  demand  inadequacy  bears  the  primary  responsibility,  let us  conduct  a 
cross—nation  comparison.  To that  end,  Figure  1  plots  average  unemployment 
rates  for 1980-84 against  nominal GDP growth  over the decade  1975-85 for  19 
OECD  nations.21  If  relatively  high  unemployment  were  associated  with 
relatively slow demand growth in  this cross section, the points would indicate 
a downward-sloping  relationship.  But a glance at  Figure 1 shows that no such 
relationship Is present.  It is also the case that, for many  of the individual 
countries  considered,  nominal  CDI'  growth  has been  more  rapid in the 1975-85 
period than during the  low—unemployment  years of 1950-70.  At this  level of 
extremely  simple  comparisons, then, the evidence does not support the notion 
that demand inadequacy is the source of  the problem. 
The  other  issues  to  be  considered  relate  to  recent  theoretical 
developments that have been interpreted  as supportive  of the hypothesis  that 
activist demand  management  is both  needed and  feasible.  In particular,  the 
—17— Figure 1 
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UnemployMent Rates, 1980-84, and nominal GDP growth, measured as  a ratio of 
1985 to  1975 values, for 19  OECD countries. 
Sources:  OECD Economic Outlook and IMF International Financial Statistics. 
—18— so—called  'efficiency  wage"  model  has  been  touted  as  justifying  this 
hypothesis,  while  the phenomenon  of  "hysteresis"  has  been  used to  justify 
calls for demand expansion.  Influential papers on  the two subjects have  been 
written  by Vellen  (1984)  and Akerlof  and Yellen  (1985)  and by Blanchard  and 
Summers (1986), respectively, while both developments have been  drawn  upon in 
a recent argument by Buiter  (1987). 
With regard  to the efficiency wage idea,  it is important to understand 
that this model  does not  itself rationalize  any  role for demand management. 
As  Yellen  (1984,  p.  204) and Akerlof and Yellen  (1985, p.825) recognize but do 
not  emphasize,  the model  is concerned  with  the configuration  of equilibrium 
employment and output magnitudes in  relation to  their socially optimal levels. 
These  equilibrium  quantities  are determined  in a block  of the macroeconomic 
system  that  is  exogenous  to  nominal  variables,  just  as  in  the  textbook 
classical  model,  Changes  in nominal  aggregate  demand  therefore  result  in 
price level changes, with no  effect on output or  employment. 
To illustrate  that point,  consider the  following version  of the static 
classical model,  in which  the symbols are y = output,  0  = employment,  n 
labor supply, w  real wage, r  Interest rate, g = real  government purchases, 
M = money supply, and P = price leveL 
(1)  y = f(n)  [Production functlon} 
(2)  f(n)  w  [MPL conditionj 
(3)  n5  h(w}  [Labor supplyl 
(4)  n  =  [Market  clearingj 
(5)  y = d(y.r) ' g  [IS function) 
(6)  M/P = L(y,r)  [LM function) 
With  M and g set by  policy, the first four equations in  this system determine 
w. y, n, and n  with  (5)  and  (6)  then yielding r and  P.  Now the efficiency 
-19— wage model alters  this system  by replacing  (4)  with the condition that  labor 
cost per efficiency unit is minimized, which can be  expressed as 
(4')  i(w) = 1. 
Also,  (1) and (2)  are replaced with 
(1')  y = f(•(w)n) 
and 
(2)  f'(4(w)n) • (w)  w. 
But with these changes, equations  (1),  (2),  (3),  (4') continue to determine 
w, y, n, and ntm.  Changes in M or g then have effects only an r and P28 
In order  to obtain an  effect of M on n and y,  Akerlof and Yellen  (1985) 
replace w with W/P, divide firms into two types, and assume that one type does 
not change its nominal price and wage  rates when M Is altered.29 This  permits 
a fall in  the average level of  w, so  has the effect of replacing  (4') with a 
sticky—price condition.  But of  course an effect of  M on w (and n) could have 
been obtained without the efficiency wage apparatus by directly adopting some 
sticky—price  assumption  in  place  of  (4),30  The  principal  role  of  the 
efficiency  wage  apparatus  Is  to rationalize an assumption  that  the  initial 
equilibrium is one with n < ntm.  I find that suggestion dubious, but that is a 
topic for another paper. 
Turning even more briefly to the topic of hysteresis, we find that a 
rather similar comment is applicable.  In  particular, acceptance  or  rejection 
of  the  hysteresis  hypothesis——which  suggests  that  the  natural  rate  of 
unemployment adjusts upward  or downward in response to  past actual rates-—has 
no  bearing on  whether aggregate demand policy can systematically influence the 
discrepancy  between  the  two.  In other  words,  If the  specification  of the 
wage—price  sector  is  (is  not) one that permits anticipated  demand actions  to 
affect the discrepancy in  the absence of hysteresis,  It will be one that does 
—20— (does not)  imply such  effects in its presence3 Furthermore,  it needs to be 
noted that the presence of hysteresis would  not be  sufficient,  for the reason 
mentioned  in footnote 10,  to contradict the natural rate hypothesis.  And  it 
should  be  kept  in  mind  that  empirical  models  designed  to  represent  the 
hysteresis  phenomenon  (e.g.  Blanchard  and  Summers,  1986,  pp.  50—55)  are 
observationally  equivalent to expectational Phillips relations in which lagged 
as well  as current  unemployment  measures appear.  For these  reasons,  it  is 
unclear  that  the  concept of hysteresis  is a crucial one  in  the context  of 
demand management  issues. 
—21— VI.  Conclusion 
It has been argued in this  paper  that  despite  fifty  years  of active 
research,  leading  scholars  continue  to  disagree  about  the  need  for,  and 
potential efficacy of, activist demand management policy.  In  my opinion, this 
situation does not result entirely from ideological predilictions or  obstinacy 
on  the  part of  either  group  of  scholars;  it  is  exceedingly  difficult  to 
acquire firm  knowledge about the workings of a dynamic system as  complex as an 
economy when  experimentation is  infeasible.  But whatever the reason, while  it 
Is  likely  that  some  activist  measures  could  be  useful,  this  cannot  be 
concluded  with -complete  certainty.  And  even  if  the  case  were  firmly 
established  that activist policy  can in principle  be  useful,  it would  remain 
true that its workings  depend upon features of  the economy  that have not been 
modelled in a reliable fashion. 
In these circumstances,  the paper suggests,  a judicious  way to conduct 
demand policy would be by  adoption of  a rule that promises to yield reasonably 
satisfactory  results under  a  variety of assumptions  regarding  the nature of 
the economys critical features  A particular rule designed in that spirit is 
here  described——a  semi—activist  rule  that  would  provide  some  stabilizing 
adjustments  but  in  an  automatic  manner  that  should  do no  harm  if  such 
adjustments were unnecessary. 
—22— Footnotes 
1.  Even  if  the  liquidity  trap was  empirically  relevant,  the real-balance 
effect  would  (as prices  fall)  automatically  stimulate  aggregate  demand  as 
needed.  Some writers have questioned this standard conclusion on the grounds 
that  it neglects dynamic considerations  involving expectations.  In McCallum 
(1983)  it  is  shown,  however,  that  with  rational  expectations  and  flexible 
prices  the standard conclusion  obtains when expectational  dynamics are taken 
Into account. 
2.  Reviews have been provided  by many writers.  A recent  version of my own 
account appears in McCallum  (1987), 
3.  For one example of this resurgence. see Blanchard (1987). 
4.  Even if It were  the  case  that  the government  directly  controlled  real 
government  purchases--its actual  instrument is nominal government purchases-— 
it would  not  follow  that  real  aggregate  demand  could  be manipulated,  as 
reference to the textbook model of a classical  (I.e.,  flexible price)  system 
indicates.  A qualification to  this statement, mentioned below  in footnote 28, 
does not overturn the point. 
5.  In particular. Ricks  (1937),  Modlgliani  (1944), and Patinkln  (1956) 
6.  Prominent examples are Barro and Grossman  (1978) and Mallnvaud  (1977). 
7.  It should be said that price adjustment relations are discussed In various 
places by  Barro and Grossman  (1976).  But this part  of their work has not been 
adopted  by subsequent  contributors  to the  disequilibrium  literature,  which 
Barro and Grossman have abandoned. 
8.  Ironically,  this Is the form of price adjustment  postulated by Barro and 
Grossman  (1976) in  their Chapter 4. 
9.  As in my 1980 example. 10.  This statement does not require that the natural—rate value be a constant 
over  time,  nor  that  it  be  trend—stationary  or  even independent  of  past 
unemployment rates.  Also,  the phrasing in the next  sentence of the text  is 
not meant  to deny  thet different  maintained  inflation  rates  have  different 
welfare implications, such as  those discussed by Friedman  (1969). 
11.  For elaboration and some examples, see McCallum  (1983,  pp. 400-401), 
12.  It  is possible,  however,  that  misperceptions  of the  type  featured  In 
Lucas's theory were  of  greater significance in  the years before  World War II. 
when  aggregate data was not readily available. 
13.  But  with  agents  assumed  to  possess  knowledge  of  current  monetary 
aggregates. 
14.  For  postwar  U.S.  quarterly  data,  detrended  by a specific  smoothing 
filter. 
15.  If it is  not, much  of  the impact snd novelty of  the RBC approach Is lost. 
16.  Consider, for example, the effects of substantial  but steady inflation on 
correlations between real variables  ae compared with  correlations bwtween one 
real and one nominal variable.  More analysis is  needed, however, to detersine 
the extent to which the suggestion in  the text is valid. 
17.  Implicetions for  fiscal policy are briefly mentioned  below. 
18.  In  the  seasonally—adjusted  quarterly  U.S.  data  for  1954-85,  the 
correlation is 0.81. 
19.  Here and elsewhere I refer to GNP rather than  GD? as an American habit. 
The precise measure of nominal output/income to be used  in the policy  rule is 
an Issue on which  I  mean to take no  position.  Gordon  (1985) has  suggested 
that nominal final sales would be  better than GNP. 
20.  One reason  is that it seems  likely that official price  Indices overstate 
inflation to a small extent. 21.  In the pre—Worid War II  era,  monetary  authorities  were kept  from this 
type  of  behavior  by  the  requirement  of  adherence  to  a  commodity—money 
standard. 
22.  Or, to be more precise, a path growing  at a rate equal to the economys 
long—term average rate of output growth.  Estimates of this rate could, if 
desired, be  updated periodically in some specified manner.  The monetary base, 
it might be mentioned, is a controllable variable since the central bank can 
read  its  value  from  its  own  balance  sheet  and  make  adjustments  whenever 
required. 
17 
23.  Note that xt_l 
- Xt17 
— bt_j  + bt.17 =  E  (Xt_j 
— btj). This 
j=1 
type Of velocity correction  was  suggested  by Meltzer  (1987),  The averaging 
period is set at four years since this term is not intended to pick  up 
cyclical effects, but long periods would unduly slow the rules response to 
non—cyclical institutional changes. 
24.  This huge RMSE  value  reflects average nominal GNP growth well in  excess 
of  3%, i.e., reflects the inflation that was experienced. 
25.  Since  drafting  this  paper,  I  have verified  that  the  rule  yields  good 
results  in  four  more  VAR  systems  and  in  small  structural"  models 
representative  of three different  theories of cyclical fluctuations  namely, 
the REC theory, the monetary misperceptions  theory, and a version of  Keynesian 
theory  as  expressed  in the  MPS  quarterly  econometric  model.  Details  are 
reported in McCallum  (1988). 
26.  Even for a highly open  economy the appropriate objective for macroeconomic 
policy is  to keep  nominal  demand  growing at  a  noninflationary  rate.  With 
regard  to fiscal policy variables, one point is that the traditional automatic 
stabilizers  provided  by  progressive  tax  schedules,  etc.  ,  are  helpful  in 
promoting  smooth growth  of  nominal GNP.  Whether tax rates should be adjusted in response to deviations of  xt is debatable. 
27.  The GPO growth measure is the ratio of nominal GDP for 1985 to its value 
for  1975.  That different  periods  are  used  for  the  two  variables  can  be 
explained as  follows.  The 1980—84 period is used for unemployment rates so as 
to  focus  on  the  greatly  increased  levels  of  the  1980's,  with  1984  the 
concluding  year because  comparable  data are not  available  for all countries 
for more recent  years.  In the  case  of demand  growth, earlier  years  were 
included  to  take  account  of  the  possibility  that  effects  occur  with a 
substantial  lag.  The choice  of precise dates is clearly quite arbitrary;  it 
is my  belief that the basic finding  is not sensitive to this choice. 
28.  This  statement  should be qualified  as follows,  There  would  be real 
effects of  changes in g if the model were modified to  permit direct government 
employment and production.  In such a case,  however, changes in g would  not 
strictly represent "demand management' actions. 
29.  They provide no justification  for the assumption  that these  firms keep 
their nominal prices unchanged; one is attempted in McCallum  (1986). 
30.  While his emphasis is very different, this conclusion  is consistent  with 
the analysis of  Buiter (1987). 
31.  The  "core  inflation"  case  presented  by Buiter  (1987)  is one  in which 
anticipated demand influences are effective.  This case provides an example of 
a  specification  in which  the  natural rate  hypothesis  does  not  obtain;  an 
accelerating  inflation  will  keep  unemployment  (expectationally)  below  the 
natural rate permanently. References 
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